Shreshth Rajan, May 2024. Written for Dr. Parimal Patil.
Dignāga's examination of the basis of cognition in Pramāṇasamuccaya and Ālambanaparīkṣā establishes two essential criteria: perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy. Perceptual accessibility requires direct sensory perception, ensuring an immediate link to reality. Causal efficacy demands a direct causal role in generating cognition, securing a functional connection between the object and the cognitive event.
Dignāga refutes three candidates for the basis of cognition: material objects, universals, and conventional objects. Material objects are dismissed due to perceptual errors that undermine their reliability. Universals fail because they are abstract and lack direct causal interaction with sense faculties. Conventional objects, while directly perceivable, are influenced by conceptual mediation and intersubjective variability, disrupting the causal chain necessary for valid cognition.
This paper claims that conventional objects, through the lens of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), offer a promising basis for cognition. Dependent origination posits that phenomena arise from interconnected causes and conditions, providing a coherent framework for understanding conventional objects. By leveraging dependent origination, I argue that conventional objects can satisfy Dignāga's criteria of perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy, challenging his refutation and aligning with Buddhist epistemology.
The paper will first discuss Dignāga's criteria and their necessity. It will examine the three candidates (material objects, universals, and conventional objects) and detail Dignāga's reasons for rejecting each. The analysis will then focus on conventional objects, arguing that their interdependent nature, as described by dependent origination, allows them to meet Dignāga's criteria effectively. The defense will demonstrate how the practical efficacy and intersubjective consistency of conventional objects align with Dignāga's requirements. Finally, potential counterarguments will be addressed to reinforce the viability of conventional objects as a basis for cognition.
By re-examining Dignāga's critique through dependent origination, this paper aims to integrate classical insights with contemporary interpretations. It seeks to show that conventional objects may provide a defensible foundation for cognition by meeting Dignāga's standards while embracing the interdependent nature of Buddhist thought.
Dignāga establishes two key criteria for the basis of cognition in his foundational works: perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy. These criteria are designed to ensure that cognitive processes reliably correspond with reality and effectively produce valid cognitive states.
Perceptual accessibility refers to the requirement that the basis of cognition must be directly perceivable through the senses. Dignāga asserts that for any cognitive process to be valid, its object must be directly accessible to sensory perception, free from conceptual construction. This criterion stems from the Buddhist emphasis on pratyakṣa (direct perception) as a primary means of acquiring valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Dignāga argues that only through direct sensory engagement can one obtain an unmediated and reliable apprehension of particulars (svalakṣaṇa), which are the unique, momentary phenomena that constitute reality. By insisting on perceptual accessibility, Dignāga seeks to ground cognition in the immediate and the concrete, avoiding the distortions introduced by conceptual and inferential processes.[1,2]
Causal efficacy, the second criterion, demands that the basis of cognition must have a direct causal role in generating cognitive events. This means that the object of cognition must not only be perceivable but also functionally contribute to the arising of the cognitive state. Dignāga emphasizes that for a cognition to be valid, there must be a robust causal connection between the object and the resulting cognitive event. This requirement aligns with the Buddhist notion of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), which posits that all phenomena arise in dependence on specific conditions. In this context, causal efficacy ensures that the cognitive process is not merely a passive reflection but an active engagement with reality, where the object causally influences the cognition.[1,2]
These criteria are desirable because they collectively ensure that cognition is both grounded in reality and functionally effective. Perceptual accessibility prevents cognitive errors by eliminating the influence of conceptual mediation, while causal efficacy guarantees that the cognitive process is genuinely influenced by the object in question. Together, these criteria form a robust framework for evaluating the validity of cognitive processes in Dignāga's epistemology.
Dignāga evaluates three candidates for the external basis of cognition: material objects, universals, and conventional objects. Each of these candidates is scrutinized against the criteria of perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy, and Dignāga provides detailed reasons for their respective failures.
Material objects, or physical entities, are the first candidate considered by Dignāga. These objects are tangible and directly perceivable, seemingly satisfying the criterion of perceptual accessibility. However, Dignāga argues that material objects are prone to perceptual errors, such as illusions and misperceptions, which undermine their reliability as a basis for cognition. He points out that sensory perception of material objects can often be deceptive, leading to incorrect cognitive states. This susceptibility to error means that material objects fail to meet the criterion of causal efficacy, as they cannot reliably produce valid cognitive outcomes.
Universals are abstract entities that represent general concepts, such as "redness" or "tree-ness." While they may play a role in our conceptual understanding, Dignāga asserts that they lack direct perceptual accessibility. Universals cannot be directly perceived by the senses; they exist only as mental constructs. This absence of direct sensory interaction means that universals fail to meet the criterion of perceptual accessibility. Furthermore, since they are abstract and do not engage in direct causal interactions with the sense faculties, universals also fail the criterion of causal efficacy. As a result, Dignāga concludes that universals cannot serve as a valid basis for cognition.
Conventional objects are the third candidate Dignāga examines. These objects are directly perceivable and exist in the shared experience of individuals within a given context. While conventional objects initially seem to satisfy the criterion of perceptual accessibility, Dignāga argues that they are influenced by conceptual mediation and intersubjective variability. This means that our perception of conventional objects is often shaped by conceptual frameworks and social agreements, rather than by the objects themselves. This conceptual mediation disrupts the causal chain needed for valid cognition, as it introduces an element of subjectivity and variability. Consequently, Dignāga contends that conventional objects fail to meet the criterion of causal efficacy, as their influence on cognitive processes is not consistently reliable.
Conventional objects, despite Dignāga's critique, present the most promising basis for cognition when reconsidered through the Buddhist concept of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Dignāga dismisses conventional objects primarily because their perception is mediated by conceptual frameworks and social agreements, leading to intersubjective variability and undermining their causal efficacy. However, this critique can be challenged by demonstrating that conventional objects, understood through the lens of dependent origination, can indeed fulfill Dignāga's criteria of perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy.
Dependent origination posits that all phenomena arise in dependence on specific causes and conditions. This interconnectedness implies that conventional objects, though conceptually mediated, are not arbitrary constructs but are grounded in a network of causal relationships. For instance, the perception of a "cup" is not merely a social construct but a result of various interdependent factors, such as the material properties of the object, the context of its use, and the shared understanding of its function. This interconnectedness aligns with the criterion of causal efficacy, as it provides a robust causal chain from the object to the cognitive event.
Moreover, conventional objects are perceptually accessible. While their perception involves conceptual mediation, this does not negate their direct perceptibility. Instead, it highlights the role of the mind in shaping perception, a notion consistent with many mind-only epistemologists like Vasubandhu. The mind, influenced by past experiences and contextual knowledge, contributes to the accurate identification and understanding of objects. This process does not undermine the perceptual accessibility of conventional objects but rather demonstrates their integral role in cognition.
To raise an objection to Dignāga's refutation, one could argue that dependent origination provides a coherent framework for understanding how conventional objects meet the criteria of valid cognition. By recognizing the interdependent nature of conventional objects, I acknowledge their causal efficacy and perceptual accessibility within a broader epistemological context. This approach not only challenges Dignāga's dismissal of conventional objects but also aligns with the fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy. In the following, I go about making such a defense.
Dependent origination, a core tenet of Buddhist philosophy, supports the practical efficacy and intersubjective consistency of conventional objects, thereby addressing Dignāga's criteria for a valid basis of cognition. This doctrine asserts that all phenomena arise in dependence on a complex web of causes and conditions, emphasizing the interconnectedness and mutual dependence of all elements in the cognitive process.
Firstly, dependent origination underscores the practical efficacy of conventional objects. In daily life and Buddhist practice, conventional objects function effectively within their respective contexts. For example, a cup is used to hold liquids, a function that is universally recognized and reliably performed. This practical efficacy is grounded in the causal relationships that define the object's existence and utility. The cup's material properties, its design, and the contextual understanding of its use collectively contribute to its causal efficacy. Therefore, conventional objects, through their practical applications, demonstrate a consistent and reliable basis for cognition.
Secondly, dependent origination ensures intersubjective consistency. While Dignāga critiques conventional objects for their conceptual mediation and intersubjective variability, dependent origination reveals that this variability is not a flaw but a reflection of the dynamic nature of reality. Intersubjective consistency arises from the shared understanding and mutual recognition of objects within a community. This shared understanding is not arbitrary but rooted in the interdependent nature of phenomena. For instance, the concept of a "cup" is consistently recognized across different contexts because it is based on the shared experiences and practical interactions of individuals. This consistency aligns with the criterion of perceptual accessibility, as it ensures that the perception of conventional objects is stable and coherent across different observers.
Moreover, the interdependent nature of conventional objects aligns with Dignāga's criteria by highlighting the causal chain that underpins cognitive processes. Dependent origination explains how conventional objects, through their interconnected causes and conditions, contribute directly to the generation of cognitive events. This causal chain is essential for establishing the validity of cognition, as it ensures that cognitive processes are grounded in the empirical reality of interdependent phenomena. Therefore, conventional objects, understood through dependent origination, fulfill the criterion of causal efficacy by providing a robust and reliable causal link between the object and the cognitive event.
Furthermore, dependent origination addresses the issue of conceptual mediation by reframing it as an integral part of the cognitive process. In Buddhist epistemology, conceptualization is not seen as a distortion but as a necessary component of understanding and engaging with reality. The mind, influenced by past experiences and contextual knowledge, plays a crucial role in shaping perception and cognition. This process ensures that conventional objects are not merely abstract constructs but are grounded in the lived experiences and practical interactions of individuals. By acknowledging the role of conceptual mediation, dependent origination demonstrates that conventional objects can satisfy both perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy within a coherent epistemological framework.
In conclusion, dependent origination provides a robust defense of conventional objects as a valid basis for cognition, meeting Dignāga's criteria of perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy. By emphasizing the interconnected and interdependent nature of phenomena, this doctrine aligns with the principles of Buddhist epistemology and offers a compelling alternative to Dignāga's refutation. Conventional objects, when understood through the lens of dependent origination, demonstrate both practical efficacy and intersubjective consistency, providing a reliable foundation for cognitive processes. This perspective not only challenges Dignāga's critique but also enriches the understanding of cognition within the broader context of Buddhist philosophy.[3]
To bolster the defense of conventional objects as a valid basis for cognition, it is crucial to delve deeper into their role within the Buddhist framework and the broader implications of their acceptance. One supporting argument is derived from the concept of upāya (skillful means) in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Upāya underscores the pragmatic approach to teachings and practices, emphasizing that conventional truths are instrumental in guiding practitioners towards ultimate truths. Conventional objects, therefore, serve as essential tools in the pedagogical process, providing a practical and accessible means for individuals to engage with and comprehend complex philosophical ideas. This pragmatic dimension aligns with the criterion of causal efficacy, as conventional objects facilitate effective cognitive engagement and transformation.[5,9,12]
Additionally, the concept of saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) versus paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth) in Buddhist philosophy offers another layer of support. Conventional truth, which includes the realm of conventional objects, is not dismissed as illusory but recognized as a necessary stepping stone towards realizing ultimate truth. This dual-layered truth framework suggests that conventional objects, while conceptually mediated, are indispensable for navigating and making sense of the empirical world. Their practical indispensability in daily life, coupled with their role in spiritual practice, underscores their validity and reliability as cognitive bases.
Furthermore, cognitive science and contemporary philosophy of mind lend support to the role of conceptual mediation in perception. Studies indicate that perception is not purely passive but involves active interpretation by the mind.[8] This interpretation, shaped by prior knowledge and contextual factors, aligns with the Buddhist understanding of cognition as an interplay between sensory input and mental constructs. Therefore, the involvement of conceptual mediation does not diminish the perceptual accessibility or causal efficacy of conventional objects but rather enhances their role in producing valid cognitive states.
A sophisticated counterargument to this, though, might assert that the inherent variability in conceptual mediation leads to cognitive instability, questioning the consistency of conventional objects as a basis for cognition. However, this concern can be addressed by, again, highlighting the stabilizing role of pratītyasamutpāda. Dependent origination ensures that the arising of conventional objects is not arbitrary but governed by specific causal conditions, which provide a stable framework for their perception and cognition. This stability, grounded in the interdependent nature of reality, mitigates the risk of cognitive instability and reinforces the reliability of conventional objects.
Another nuanced counter argument could be the claim that conceptual mediation introduces a level of subjectivity that is incompatible with objective cognition. While it is true that conceptual frameworks influence perception, this influence is not inherently subjective in a detrimental sense. Instead, it reflects the dynamic interaction between the perceiver and the perceived, a process acknowledged in Buddhist thought as integral to understanding reality. The shared nature of conceptual frameworks, shaped by cultural and social contexts, ensures a level of intersubjective consistency that aligns with Dignāga's criteria. This shared understanding supports the argument that conventional objects can consistently fulfill the requirements for valid cognition.
Critics may also argue that Dignāga's criteria are rigidly opposed to any form of conceptual mediation, viewing it as a source of distortion rather than clarity. However, this interpretation overlooks the flexibility within Buddhist epistemology regarding the role of the mind in cognition. Conceptual mediation, when understood through dependent origination, does not distort reality but rather reveals the interconnected nature of phenomena. This perspective allows for a harmonious integration of conceptual constructs within the process of valid cognition, demonstrating that conventional objects can indeed meet the stringent criteria set by Dignāga.
This paper has demonstrated that, contrary to Dignāga's initial dismissal, conventional objects can indeed serve as a valid basis for cognition when reinterpreted through the Buddhist concept of dependent origination. Dignāga's criteria of perceptual accessibility and causal efficacy are essential for ensuring reliable and valid cognition. While he critiques material objects, universals, and conventional objects for failing to meet these criteria, a deeper examination of conventional objects through the lens of dependent origination reveals their potential to fulfill these requirements effectively. The interconnected nature of conventional objects ensures their functional role in cognition, while their shared understanding across individuals supports stable and coherent cognitive processes. This approach not only challenges Dignāga's critique but also enriches the understanding of cognition within Buddhist thought, offering a compelling alternative that bridges classical insights with contemporary interpretations.